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“One can't have something for nothing. Happiness has got to be paid 
for.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Of all the conflicts in Africa’s documented history, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Congo”) is considered the home 
of the deadliest conflict thus far.2 Though the Congo’s civil war ended 
in 2002, the humanitarian crisis remains – where dangerous and 
armed rebel groups routinely engage in rape, torture, exploitation of 
children, and other harmful activities.3 The conflict in the Congo 
                                                                                                             
1. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 170 (1932). 
2. See Shannon Raj, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the Legislation 
that Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 984 (2011) (describing the Congo’s 
conflict among Africa’s documented history). 
3. See Marcia Narine, Emerging Issues in Social Enterprise: From Kansas to the Congo: 
Why Naming and Shaming Corporations Through the Dodd-Frank’s Act’s Corporate 
Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 358 
(2012) (discussing what devastating occurrences are associated with the Congo’s mineral 
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covers a wide range of tensions, from internal and regional struggles, 
to strains over identity, ethnicity, and resources.4 In 2010, the United 
Nations described the conflict in the Congo as one of the worst 
humanitarian crises in the world.5 A significant part of this crisis is 
the mineral trade and the conflict surrounding it.6 The damaging 
conflict that has existed for decades in the Congo is further 
exacerbated by the armed forces financing themselves through 
controlling the country’s mineral mines and mining communities.7 
Because militias and armies in the Congo vie for control over 
these mines, the struggle for power over these sources of wealth often 
involves armed violence and human rights abuses that thrive under 
the country’s weak governance framework.8 Militias in the Congo 
extort and implement taxation along different stages of the mineral 
trade, forcing buyers to pay bribes at roadblocks and border 
crossings.9 The armed forces then use this money to purchase more 
weapons, further fueling the violence.10 It has been estimated that 
armed groups in the Congo were enriched with US$185 million per 
year from the mineral trade.11 
                                                                                                             
trade); see also Raj, supra note 2, at 989-90 (noting the prevalence of rape and sexual torture 
in the Congo). 
4. See Raj, supra note 2, at 985 (describing the range of conflict within the Congo). 
5. See id. at 988 (describing the contribution of the mineral trade to the conflict in the 
Congo). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. See also Alexandrea L. Nelson, The Materiality of Morality: Conflict Minerals, 
UTAH L. REV. 219, 222 (2014) (discussing the violent methods of armed groups used to 
maintain control over mining communities in the Congo). 
8. See Joshua A. Feinzeig, Promoting World Peace Through the Use of the “Good 
Book”: Implementing Foreign Policy Through the Tax Code, 40 BROOK J. INT’L. L. 953, 959 
(2015) (discussing the role of armed forces in the mineral trade); David C.W. Wagner,  
Breaking the Nexus Between Armed Conflict and Consumer Products: Where’s the App For 
That?, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 103, 130 (2012) (mentioning the weak governance in the 
Congo); see also Karen Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as 
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2012) (noting 
that mineral resources provide funding for violent militias). 
9. See Raj, supra note 2, at 989 (discussing the militias and their systematic extortion 
and taxation); see also Wagner, supra note 8, at 107 (listing extortion techniques of armed 
groups in the Congo). 
10. See Raj, supra note 2, at 989 (discussing the militias and their systematic extortion 
and taxation); see also Wagner, supra note 8, at 107 (listing extortion techniques of armed 
groups in the Congo).  
11. See David Smith, Congo Mines No Longer in Grip of Warlords and Militias, Says 
Report, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2014, 1:05 P.M.), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun
/11/congo-mines-no-longer-grip-warlords-militias-report-enough-project (discussing the 
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“Conflict Minerals” are known as minerals mined under 
conditions of armed conflict and human rights abuses, specifically in 
the eastern provinces of the Congo.12 These minerals are tin, tantalum 
(also known as columbine tantalum or “coltan”), tungsten, and gold, 
and are sometimes collectively referred to as “3T+G.”13 These 
minerals largely originate from central Africa, particularly the eastern 
Congo and its neighboring countries, Uganda and Rwanda.14 
Various electronic products are reported to contain Conflict 
Minerals originating from the Congo and its prevalent mineral trade.15 
Multiple steps are involved before raw minerals like 3T+G make it 
into the consumer market and electronics.16 These steps are part of the 
supply chain, which is a system of all activities, organizations, actors, 
technology, information, resources, and services that bring raw 
minerals from its extraction site to the final product for consumers.17 
Though it has been widely reported that many companies, such as 
technology company giant Apple Inc. (“Apple”), may manufacture 
                                                                                                             
advantages of US conflict mineral legislation); A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s 
Conflict Minerals - Strategy Paper, ENOUGH PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2009), 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/comprehensive-approach-conflict-minerals-
strategy-paper; see also Allison M. Blake, SEC Cannot Clean the Electronics Industry Alone: 
“Blood Minerals” Mandatory Disclosure Legislation Effective Only If Applied Across the 
Board, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 395, 398 (providing estimated profits from the mineral trade). 
12 See What are Conflict Minerals, SOURCE INTELLIGENCE, https://www. 
sourceintelligence.com/what-are-conflict-minerals/ (detailing what minerals are commonly 
considered to be Conflict Minerals).  
13. See Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716 §I(A), n.6 (Aug. 22, 
2012) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule Release]. 
14. See Emily Veale, Is There Blood on Your Hands-Free Device?: Examining 
Legislative Approached to the Conflict Minerals Problem in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 504 (2013) (discussing the origins of conflict 
minerals). 
15. See Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 953 (stating that “minerals are found in commonplace 
electronic devices that people around the world depend upon in their daily routines.”); Narine, 
supra note 3, at 359 (stating that “almost every consumer product that requires electronics uses 
one of the four regulated minerals collectively known as the “3Ts+G.”); Raj, supra note 2, at 
989 (discussing different components of electronics often comprised of Conflict Minerals); 
Veale, supra note 14, at 515-16 (detailing the link between the use of electronics and Conflict 
Minerals). 
16. These steps are: extraction, transport, handling, trading, processing, smelting, 
refining and alloying, manufacturing, and sale of end product. See OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas, OECD PUBLISHING 4 (2d ed. 2013) https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/
GuidanceEdition2.pdf [hereinafter OECD Due Diligence Guidance]. 
17. Id. at 14. 
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products containing Conflict Minerals, the exact percentage of these 
products is difficult to quantify because of a lack of transparency 
within global supply chains.18 The difficulty of quantifying an exact 
percentage is likely due to the fact that global supply chains include 
multiple tiers of suppliers that cannot be easily traced.19 To illustrate 
this difficulty, an employee of technology company, Phillips, stated 
that, “for electronic components, the supply chain can easily be fifty 
tiers deep,” where many suppliers provide the company with limited 
or no information regarding its origins.20 
Arguably, consumers of products containing these minerals have 
a “direct hand” in the ongoing crisis in the Congo.21 As US 
Congressman Jim McDermott stated, one of the issues that goes 
largely unnoticed for a majority of Americans is that no one is 
thinking of the Congo or Conflict Minerals, yet every cell phone user 
most likely has Conflict Minerals every time they make a call, 
“potentially, right next to their ear.”22 Since Conflict Minerals are 
often key components of many devices, consumers may be financing 
the conflict surrounding the mineral trade by continuously buying 
new electronics, particularly smartphones.23 As previously mentioned, 
                                                                                                             
18. See Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
419, 431 (2015) (discussing the lack of transparency within global supply chains); see 
generally OECD Due Diligence Guidance, supra note 16, at 14. 
19. See Victor Luckerson, There May Be Conflict Minerals in Your Smartphone, TIME 
(June 3, 2014), http://time.com/2819594/conflict-minerals-apple-google-intel-amazon/ (stating 
that “because such materials travel through a variety of smelters, manufacturers and 
distributors before they end up in a phone or laptop, vetting the entire manufacturing line is a 
difficult, expensive process”); see also Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 431-32 (discussing the lack 
of transparency within global supply chains). 
20.  Sarfaty, supra note 18, at 431-32 (illustrating the difficulty of tracking global supply 
chains). 
21. Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 954 (discussing how consumers indirectly fund the conflict 
mineral trade). 
22. Mary Beth Sheridan, U.S. Financial Reform Bill Also Targets ‘Conflict Minerals’ 
from Congo, WASH. POST (July 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/20/AR2010072006212.html.  Jim McDermott was a member of 
the US House of Representatives for the state of Washington from 1989-2017. Jim McDermott 
Biography, CONGRESS.GOV, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index
=M000404. 
23. See Ved P. Nanda, Conflict Minerals and International Business: United States and 
International Responses, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 286 (“Consumer demand for cell 
phones, laptops, appliances, and jewelry fuels this trade and triggers the conflicts.”); see also 
Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 953 (stating that “minerals are found in commonplace electronic 
devices that people around the world depend upon in their daily routines”); Narine, supra note 
3, at 359 (stating “almost every consumer product that requires electronics uses one of the four 
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the armed groups in the Congo exploit the region’s mineral wealth to 
enrich themselves and maintain control through violent methods.24 
With high consumer demand for devices such as smartphones, there is 
a chance that minerals within electronic devices originated from 
mines controlled by these dangerous armed groups.25 
Each mineral is often found in various products.26 The Congo is 
the sixth largest manufacturer of tin, which is used as a solder on 
circuit boards, and produces about twenty percent of the world’s 
tantalum, which is found in cell phones, digital cameras, and portable 
music players.27 Tungsten is used to make cell phones vibrate, and 
gold is frequently used in constructing electronics.28 In 2015, it was 
reported that in the United States alone, nearly two-thirds of its 
population now owns a smartphone, and fifteen percent of the 
population ages eighteen to twenty-nine are reported to be heavily 
dependent on their smartphones for online access.29 Globally, there 
are approximately 2.6 billion smartphone users.30 By 2020, this 
number is expected to jump to 6.1 billion.31 Total global smartphone 
shipments were estimated to be 341.5 million in 2016, a one percent 
increase from the 338 million smartphones shipped in 2015.32 One 
                                                                                                             
regulated minerals collectively known as the “3Ts+G”); Raj, supra note 2, at 989 (discussing 
different components of electronics often comprised of Conflict Minerals); Veale, supra note 
14, at 515-16 (detailing the link between the use of electronics and Conflict Minerals). 
24. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
25. See Nanda, supra note 23, at 286 (“Consumer demand for cell phones, laptops, 
appliances, and jewelry fuels this trade and triggers the conflicts.”) 
26. See infra notes 27-28. 
27. See Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 959 (discussing the Congo’s abundant mineral wealth). 
28. Gold is a key source of mineral wealth in the Congo, with armed groups receiving 
profits as much as US$88 million annually. See Raj, supra note 2, at 989 (discussing how 
Conflict Minerals are used in electronic devices); Erin Banco, Is Your Cell Phone Fueling 
Civil War in Congo?, ATLANTIC (July 11, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2011/07/is-your-cell-phone-fueling-civil-war-in-congo/241663/ 
(detailing the purpose of Conflict Minerals in cell phones). 
29. Aaron Smith, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015 (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/ (examining the role of 
smartphones in the United States).  
30. Ingrid Lunden, 6.1B Smartphone Users Globally By 2020, Overtaking Basic Fixed 
Phone Subscriptions, TECH CRUNCH (June 2, 2015) https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/02/6-1b-
smartphone-users-globally-by-2020-overtaking-basic-fixed-phone-subscriptions/. 
31. See id. at 30 (providing number of smartphone users worldwide). 
32. See Daniel Eran Dilger, Strategy Analytics: Apple’s iPhone 6s the World’s Most 
Popular Smartphone in Q2, APPLE INSIDER (Sept. 6, 2016), http://appleinsider.com/articles/
16/09/06/strategy-analytics-apples-iphone-6s-the-worlds-most-popular-smartphone-in-q2. 
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glaring example of the pervasiveness of smartphones is the iPhone, 
manufactured by Apple.33 As of early 2016, Apple’s iPhone remains 
the top choice by consumers in two of the world’s largest smartphone 
markets: the United States and China.34 Moreover, as of July 2016 
total global iPhone sales have reached approximately one billion.35 
This Note examines the United States’ Conflict Minerals 
legislation, specifically Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), a 
provision aimed at combating the human rights abuses and conflict 
associated with the Congolese mineral trade, and compares this 
provision to a similar forthcoming regulation in the European 
Union.36 Part I discusses the conflict associated with the Congo 
mineral trade and the history behind this conflict. Part II details the 
background behind Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and analyzes 
the effects of this provision on the Congo. Part III then reviews the 
European Union’s current Conflict Minerals regulation proposal and 
the process behind it. Lastly, Part IV argues that the European Union 
should learn from the shortcomings of Section 1502 when finalizing 
their own Conflict Minerals regulation. This Part provides 
                                                                                                             
33. See Lance Whitney, iPhone is Top Phone Brand in US and China, CNET (Jan. 27, 
2016), https://www.cnet.com/news/iphone-once-again-top-phone-in-us-and-china/ (discussing 
the Apple iPhone’s continuing popularity). It is important to note that Apple now audits 100% 
of its suppliers for links to conflict minerals. See Emily Chasan, Apple Says Supply Chain Now 
100% Audited for Conflict Minerals, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-30/apple-says-supply-chain-now-100-
audited-for-conflict-minerals. However, one must keep in mind that Apple auditing 100% of 
its mineral suppliers does not necessarily mean its products are now Conflict Mineral free, 
which Apple acknowledges and recognizes. See Carly Oboth, Why It’s a Good Thing Apple 
Isn’t Declaring its Products Conflict-Free, GLOBAL WITNESS (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/why-its-good-thing-apple-isnt-declaring-its-products-
conflict-free/ (discussing Apple’s Conflict Minerals Report where Apple states “Apple does 
not believe that Third Party Audit program participation alone is sufficient to label products 
‘conflict free.’ Apple believes it has more work to do.”). 
34. See Whitney, supra note 33 (discussing the Apple iPhone’s continuing popularity). 
35. See Sam Costello, How Many iPhones Have Been Sold Worldwide?, LIFEWIRE (Nov. 
3, 2016), http://ipod.about.com/od/glossary/f/how-many-iphones-sold.htm; Nick Statt, 1 
Billion Apple Devices Are in Active Use Around the World, VERGE (Jan. 26, 2016), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/26/10835748/apple-devices-active-1-billion-iphone-ipad-ios. 
36. The Dodd-Frank Act was passed in the United States as legislation aimed at financial 
regulatory reform to create a robust foundation for lasting economic growth and job creation in 
the United States. Wall-Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform (last 
accessed Oct. 9, 2016).  
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recommendations on how the European Union can produce a stronger 
means of combating Conflict Mineral related human rights violations. 
I. CONFLICT IN THE CONGO 
To better understand the complexities of the conflict behind the 
mineral trade, Part I provides a brief overview of the history behind 
Congo’s mineral exploitation and its effects. The following also 
details what fuels the present-day conflict occurring in the Congo. 
Lastly, the effects of this present-day conflict are discussed and the 
profitability of the Conflict Mineral industry is estimated. 
A. Origins of the Conflict 
In the late 19th century, the Congo was victim to brutal 
colonization by King Leopold II of Belgium.37 Leopold exploited the 
Congo’s natural resources through tyrannical practices, such as 
widespread slave labor.38 After experiencing pressure from the Great 
Powers condemning his brutality in the Congo, Leopold transferred 
control of the Congo Free State to the Belgian government in 1908.39 
His profits from his twenty-year exploitation of the Congo were 
approximately US$1.1 billion when calculating by today’s 
standards.40 In 1960, Belgium accepted the Congo’s independence.41 
Shortly thereafter, the Congo’s new government faced national 
mutiny and threats from numerous secession movements.42 Cold War 
tensions fueled the Congo’s leadership struggle, with the United 
States fearing that Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba would break-up 
the Congo and allow Soviet control of central Africa.43 Supported by 
the United States and Belgium, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu 
                                                                                                             
37.  Roots of the Crisis – Congo, ENOUGH PROJECT, http://www.enoughproject.org/
conflict_areas/eastern_congo/roots-crisis (last accessed Oct. 17, 2016) (detailing the 
background behind the violent conflict in the Congo). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Anne DeVoe, Carrying A Piece of Congo in Our Pockets: Global Complicity to 
Congo’s Sexual Violence and the Conflict Minerals Trade, 10 SEATTLE J.  SOC. JUST. 463, 472 
(2011) (detailing the Congo’s long history of conflict). 
41. Roots of the Crisis – Congo, supra note 37. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
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dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba, who was arrested and 
assassinated in 1961.44 
In 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko ousted President Kasavubu in a coup 
to gain control of the government, with help from the United States 
and Belgium.45 Seko used the Congo’s mineral wealth to fight off 
rivals, enrich himself and his allies through a system of corruption so 
severe that the country was soon labeled a “kleptocracy.”46 Seko also 
allowed officials to steal so he could avoid paying them.47 Three 
decades later, about 800,000 ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus were 
killed in the Rwandan Genocide by Rwanda’s Hutu extremist 
government.48 Those responsible for the genocide fled to the Congo, 
where Seko allowed them to launch attacks against Rwanda while in 
the Congo.49 Many Hutus from Rwanda who had committed extreme 
human rights abuses also moved into the Congo, heightening the 
conflict in the region further.50 In 1997, rebels ousted Seko, and 
Laurent Kabila became president and remained in that position until 
his assassination by one of his bodyguards.51 His son, Joseph Kabila, 
succeeded him eight days later and is the current president.52 
                                                                                                             
44. Id. 
45. Id; DR Congo country profile, BBC (Nov. 15, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13283212; The Congo, Decolonization, and the Cold 
War, 1960–1965 , U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Milestones, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/congo-decolonization. 
46. A kleptocracy is a type of government where a country’s ruler uses political power to 
pilfer the country’s resources. See Roots of the Crisis – Congo, supra note 37; see also Howard 
W. French, Anatomy of an Autocracy: Mobutu’s 32-Year Reign, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1997), 
https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/051797zaire-mobutu.html. 
47.  Will Kabila Go?, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2015) http://www.economist.com/news/
middle-east-and-africa/21679750-war-weary-citizens-are-scared-joseph-kabila-may-not-retire-
gracefully-will. 
48.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Short Timeline, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, 
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/democratic-republic-congo-short-timeline 
(providing historical timeline of significant events in the Congo) (last accessed Nov. 6, 2016); 
DR Congo: Chronology, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 21, 2009) 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/21/dr-congo-chronology#_War (detailing extensive 
chronology of significant events in the Congo). The Hutus and Tutsis are African ethnic 
groups. See Hutu and Tutsi History, HUM. RTS. WATCH (1999), https://www.hrw.org/
reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-09.htm. 
49. Roots of the Crisis – Congo, supra note 37. 
50. Katherine D. Van Marter,  Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Unintended 
Consequences of the Conflict Minerals Rule, 24 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 291, 293 
(discussing the beginnings of the conflict in the Congo). 
51. Roots of the Crisis – Congo, supra note 37. 
52. Id. 
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B. The Conflict Behind “Conflict Minerals” 
Although the Seko’s reign in the Congo ended nearly a decade 
ago, the exploitation of the mineral trade is still prevalent today.53 The 
vast majority of the Congo’s mineral resources is located in its 
Eastern region, which is currently controlled by four armed groups.54 
The four groups are: (1) Forces Democratiques de Liberation du 
Rwanda (“FDLR”), (2) Congres national pour la defense du people 
(“CNDP”), (3) Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du 
Congo (“FARDC,” or the Congolese National Army), and (4) various 
Mai Mai militias.55 Of these groups, the FARDC are considered 
“official forces,” while the FDLR and Mai Mai militias are 
considered the “rebel groups.”56 
The FDLR, an ethnic Hutu militia, is considered one of the most 
feared groups, and is known to ally with smaller militias and the 
Congolese army.57 UN investigators have connected the FDLR to 
various attacks in the eastern Congo region.58 According to UN 
investigators, the attacks in the eastern Congo are linked to 
competition between the FDLR and other groups over the mineral 
trade and control over the mineral mines.59 
Pursuant to a March 2009 peace deal with the Congolese 
government, the CNDP integrated its forces with FARDC.60 The 
peace deal provided for the transformation of the CNDP to a political 
party integrated with FARDC, in exchange for the release of the 
                                                                                                             
53. See generally Tom Burgis, Dodd-Frank’s Misadventures in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, POLITICO MAG. (May 10, 2015), http://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2015/05/dodd-frank-democratic-republic-of-congo-117583); Lauren Wolfe, 
How Dodd-Frank is Failing the Congo, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 2, 2015), 
foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/02/how-dodd-frank-is-failing-congo-mining-conflict-minerals/.  
54. Veale, supra note 14, at 512-13 (discussing armed groups implicated in the crisis 
within the Congo). 
55. Id. 
56.  The Eastern Congo, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/congo-
democratic-republic-of/eastern-congo/p37236#!/ (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016). 
57. PETER EICHSTAEDT, CONSUMING THE CONGO: WAR AND CONFLICT MINERALS IN 
THE WORLD’S DEADLIEST PLACE, Prologue (2011). 
58. Veale, supra note 14, at 513. 
59. Veale, supra note 14, at 512-13. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Peace 
Agreement Between the Government and the National Congress for the Defence of the People 
(CNDP) (Mar. 23, 2009) [hereinafter CNDP Peace Deal]. 
60. See CNDP Peace Deal, supra note 59; Veale, supra note 14, at 514. 
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CNDP’s former members captured by the Congolese government.61 
However, this agreement has done little to diminish the conflict in 
eastern Congo.62 The same rebel units within the CNDP still occupy 
the same territory, yet now they are under the façade of government.63 
Though FARDC was established to end violence in the Congo, 
various warlords incorporated their men in FARDC in name only, 
maintaining divided command structures, rather than a unification of 
the various rebel groups as mandated by the peace deal.64 
C. Tangible Effects of the Conflict 
As previously mentioned, the violence surrounding the mineral 
trade has intensified conflict already present in the Congo for 
decades.65 The mineral trade has funded armed groups who have 
heightened human rights abuses in the Congo for years.66 The armed 
groups responsible for violently fighting over mineral mines are also 
considered responsible for the civilian-directed violence.67 In addition 
to extorting and implementing taxation at roadblocks and border 
crossings, forcing mineral buyers to pay bribes at roadblocks and 
border crossings, and using this money to purchase more weapons, 
armed groups in local mining areas control the population through the 
methods of kidnap and rape.68 
                                                                                                             
61.  DR Congo Government, CNDP rebels 'sign peace deal', AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE  
(Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/DR_Congo_government_
CNDP_rebels_sign_peace_deal_999.html; Michael Deibert, Congo peace deal was doomed to 
failure, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/21/congo-
m23-deal-goma. 
62. Veale, supra note 14, at 514. 
63. Id. 
64. Id; DR Congo Government, CNDP rebels 'sign peace deal', supra note 61. 
65. See supra Section I.A; Brian Stuart Silverman, One Mineral at a Time: Shaping 
Transnational Corporate Social Responsibility Through Dodd-Frank Section 1502, 16 OR. 
REV. INT’L L. 127, at 133-34 (“The D.R. Congo has been mired in conflict for the better part 
of the last two decades.”) 
66.  Conflict Minerals, GLOBAL WITNESS, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/
conflict-minerals/#more (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016). 
67. Silverman, supra note 65, at 134 (discussing the violence within the Congo’s mining 
communities; see also Narine supra note 3, at 381 (detailing the conflict Congolese civilians 
are often subjected to). 
68. Harry D. Gobrecht, Technically Correct: Using Technology to Supplement Due 
Diligence Standards in Eastern D.R. Congo Conflict Minerals Mining, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. 
& POL’Y 413, 418 (2011); see also Raj, supra note 2. 
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One of the most devastating elements of the conflict is the 
ongoing rape epidemic.69 In 2010, a study estimated that around 1.8 
million Congolese women have been victims of rape.70 Most of the 
perpetrators in the eastern Congo region are said to be government 
soldiers or militia fighters, and some have been reported to be 
Congolese police.71 Rape is considered pervasive in this region 
because of the Congo’s corrupt court system, and perpetrators are 
often confident they will suffer no consequences.72 Although the 
Congolese parliament reformed the country’s rape laws in recent 
years, some have doubted its effectiveness since prosecuting rape not 
a high priority as it is expensive and time-consuming.73 Because 
perpetrators are often the armed forces or rebel groups who depend on 
mineral wealth to make a profit, the rape epidemic is strongly 
associated with the mineral trade.74 Sexual violence and rape are 
considered “common tools” used by these armed groups to preserve 
control and power over mining communities.75 Government 
corruption is rampant in the region, so much so that the Congo’s 
security forces are unable to adequately protect communities from 
armed forces “poorly disciplined, ill equipped, and the worst abusers 
of human rights in the [Congo].”76 
                                                                                                             
69. See Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the 
Congo); McDermott Bill, infra note 97, at §2. 
70. See Nelson, supra note 7, at 222 (discussing the violent methods of armed groups 
used to maintain control over mining communities in the Congo). 
71. See Narine supra note 3, at 377 (listing the common perpetrators of rape in the 
Congo); see also Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the 
Congo). 
72. See Narine supra note 3, at 377 (listing the common perpetrators of rape in the 
Congo); see also Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the 
Congo). 
73. See Narine supra note 3, at 377 (listing the common perpetrators of rape in the 
Congo); see also Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the 
Congo). 
74. See Eichstaedt, supra note 57, Chapter 5 (discussing the rape epidemic in the 
Congo); see also Narine, supra note 3, at 381 (discussing the conflict over minerals, “[r]ebels 
loot, pillage, rape, and murder innocent civilians for a host of complex reasons, including for 
their minerals”). 
75. See Nelson, supra note 7, at 222 (discussing the violent methods of armed groups 
used to maintain control over mining communities in the Congo). 
76. Id. 
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Another devastating element of the conflict in the Congo is the 
gruesome child labor in the region.77 Although the region has made 
strides towards the improvement of child labor conditions by 
implementing a UN-backed action plan to end the recruitment and use 
of child soldiers, Congolese children still engage in harrowing forms 
of child labor–the mining of Conflict Minerals.78 Mining often 
involves sifting, cleaning, sorting, working underground, transporting, 
carrying heavy loads, use of mercury and explosives, and digging in 
the production of different minerals.79 Children are described to be the 
most vulnerable to mine owners who do not want to pay for 
workers.80 Rather, mine owners or managers will exploit children’s 
hunger by offering a single meal for mining work, or promising the 
fun of adventure.81 Children are also preferred as miners because their 
smaller bodies enable them to go down narrow, yet dangerous mining 
shafts.82 
II. DODD-FRANK’S SECTION 1502 
The United States has taken measures to address the ongoing 
conflict related to the mineral trade through comprehensive 
                                                                                                             
77. According to the US Department of Labor’s 2015 report on child labor in the Congo, 
the penalties for forced or compulsory child labor do little to deter armed forces from forcing 
children to engage in dangerous labor. The US Department of Labor lists various child labor 
laws in the Congo. Some relevant to the discussion of children mining conflict minerals are: 
(1) Minimum Age of Work is 16 under Article 6 of the Labor Code; Article 50 of the Child 
Protection Code (75, 76); (2) Minimum Age for Hazardous Work is 18 under Article 10 of the 
Ministerial Order Establishing the Conditions for Children’s Work (77); (3) Prohibition of 
Hazardous Occupations or Activities for Children under Articles 28–35 of Ministerial Order 
on Working Conditions for Women and Children; Articles 10–15 of the Ministerial Order 
Establishing the Conditions for Children’s Work; Article 26 of the Mining Code (77-79); and 
(4) Prohibition of Forced Labor under Articles 2 and 3 of the Labor Code; Articles 53 and 187 
of the Child Protection Code; Articles 16 and 61 of the Constitution; Article 8 of the 
Ministerial Order Establishing the Conditions for Children’s Work (59, 75-77). Congo’s Child 
Protection Code established a penalty of one to three years imprisonment and small fines for 
forced child labor, while the Ministry of Mines drafted a code calling for a punishment of five 
to ten years for forced child labor in mining sites. Off. of Child Lab., Forced Lab., and Hum. 
Trafficking, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor (2015) 
[hereinafter USDOL Report].  
78. USDOL Report, supra note 77. 
79. Id. 
80. ZORBA LESLIE ET AL., THE CONGO REPORT: SLAVERY IN CONFLICT MINERALS 12 
(2011) (detailing the several types of slavery within the Congo’s mines). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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legislation. First, this Part describes the United States’ early attempts 
at formulating Conflict Mineral legislation. Next, this Part examines 
the United States’ final version of Conflict Minerals legislation, 
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the reasons behind why the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was ultimately chosen 
as its enforcer, and which alternative agencies that many believe may 
be better equipped to enforce Section 1502. Lastly, this Part analyzes 
the effects of this provision on the Congolese people. 
A. The United States Approach: Disclosure 
The touchstone of Section 1502 is disclosure, as evidenced by 
Congress’ focus on disclosure as a remedy to the Conflict Minerals 
problem.83 This section discusses the background behind Section 
1502, and the various pieces of legislation preceding this provision. 
Additionally, this section reviews different suggestions addressing the 
Conflict Minerals problem, along with the effects of Section 1502 on 
the Congo and its people. 
1. Early Attempts at Addressing the Conflict Minerals Problem 
Then-US Senator Barack Obama introduced the DRC Relief, 
Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (“2006 Congo 
Act”), later signed into law by President Bush.84 The 2006 Congo Act 
established United States policy objectives addressing various 
humanitarian, social and economic development concerns in the 
Congo.85 The 2006 Congo Act also provided potential consequences 
for any country “meddling” in the Congo.86 Here, the Secretary of 
                                                                                                             
83. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-18 
(2010). 
84. See Democratic Republic of Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-457, §1502(a), 120 Stat. 3384 (2010) [hereinafter 2006 Congo Act]; 
see also Narine, supra note 3. George W. Bush was the 43rd president of the United States. 
See George W. Bush Biography, http://www.biography.com/people/george-w-bush-9232768. 
President Bush signed the 2006 Congo Act into law during his second term of presidency. 
During this time, President Obama was senator for the state of Illinois. See Barack Obama 
Biography, http://www.biography.com/people/barack-obama-12782369. 
85. See 2006 Congo Act, supra note 84; see also Narine, supra note 3, at 381. 
86. See Armin Rosen, The U.S. Ally That Brings Violence to the Congo and Gets Away 
With It, ATLANTIC (Jul. 13, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/ 
archive/2012/07/the-us-ally-that-brings-violence-to-the-congo-and-gets-away-with-it/259777/; 
see also 2006 Congo Act, supra note 84. 
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State is authorized to withhold assistance made available under the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 if the Secretary determines a country 
in question appears to play a hand in destabilizing the Congo.87 
Non-governmental organizations (“NGO”) continually pressured 
officials to enact legislation to address the conflict in the Congo.88 
Many NGOs believed that by raising awareness of the connection 
between mineral mining, consumer electronic products, and the 
ongoing violence in the Congo, it would give rise to socially 
responsible investors and companies.89 Because the 2006 Congo Act 
did not center on the conflict surrounding the Congo mineral trade, 
legislators in Congress pushed for legislation that specifically 
addressed this problem.90 
In 2009, former Kansas Senator Sam Brownback introduced the 
Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 (“Brownback Bill”).91 The 
Brownback Bill proposed that the SEC amend Section 13 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) to require 
companies whose products may contain Conflict Minerals to publicly 
disclose this information.92 In a section entitled “Sense of Congress 
on Assistance for Affected Communities,” the Brownback Bill also 
called for increased assistance to the Congolese affected by the 
conflict–medical treatment, humanitarian relief, rehabilitation 
services, and psychological assistance.93 This bill suggested that 
                                                                                                             
87. See 2006 Congo Act, supra note 84; see also Rosen, supra note 86. 
88. Narine, supra note 3, at 384 (discussing the advocacy of NGOs regarding conflict 
mineral legislation). 
89. See id. 
90. See 2006 Congo Act, supra note 84; Narine, supra note 3, at 384 (discussing the 
advocacy of NGOs regarding conflict mineral legislation). 
91. See Congo Conflict Minerals Act, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter 
Brownback Bill]; see also Narine, supra note 3. Samuel Brownback served as a US senator for 
two terms (1996-2011). He is now governor of the state of Kansas. See Governor Sam 
Brownback, KAN. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, http://www.governor.ks.gov/about-the-
office/governor-sam-brownback (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016). 
92. Narine, supra note 3. The Exchange Act is US legislation that gives the SEC the 
power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents, and clearing agencies 
as well as the nation’s securities self-regulatory organizations (SROs). See The Laws That 
Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934. 
93. The Brownback Bill specifically lists solutions as: “(1) to provide medical treatment, 
psychological support, and rehabilitation assistance for survivors of sexual and gender-based 
violence; (2) to provide humanitarian relief and basic services to people displaced by violence; 
(3) to improve living conditions and livelihood prospects for artisanal miners and mine 
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Congress task the United States Agency for International 
Development (“USAID”) with expanding its programs to help 
Congolese communities adversely affected by the mineral trade.94 
Additionally, the Brownback Bill suggested that Congress work with 
other countries to: (1) increase protection and services for 
communities in the eastern Congo at risk of human rights violations 
associated with the mineral trade, particularly women and girls; (2) 
strengthen the management and trade of natural resources in the 
Congo; and (3) improve conditions and livelihood prospects of miners 
and mine workers.95 Though the Brownback Bill garnered some 
support, including that of then-Senator Hillary Clinton who believed 
there was connection with mineral mining and human rights abuse, 
the Brownback Bill did not pass.96 
Later in 2009, Congressman Jim McDermott introduced the 
Conflict Minerals Trade Act (“McDermott Bill”).97 Upon returning to 
central Africa in 2007 after serving as a medical officer over twenty 
years prior, McDermott was shocked by the overwhelming presence 
of human rights abuses in the Congo.98 Similar to the Brownback Bill, 
the McDermott Bill aimed to address human rights abuses associated 
with the Congolese mineral trade.99 The McDermott Bill also outlined 
similar solutions to the human rights abuses with a section entitled 
“Sense of Congress on Assistance for Affected Communities,” 
tasking USAID with expanding their programs and calling on to 
Congress to work with other countries to achieve these ends.100 One 
                                                                                                             
workers; and (4) to alleviate poverty by reconstructing infra-structure and revitalizing 
agricultural production.” Brownback Bill, supra note 91. 
94. Brownback Bill, supra note 91. 
95. Id. 
96. Narine, supra note 3, at 386. Secretary Clinton was senator for the State of New 
York, US 67th Secretary of State, and 2016 US Presidential Nominee for the Democratic 
Party. See Hillary Clinton Biography, http://www.biography.com/people/hillary-clinton-
9251306 (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016). 
97. Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong., 1st Session (2009) [hereinafter 
McDermott Bill]. 
98. Ben Protess, Dodd-Frank Strays Far From Street, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2011), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980DE4DA153DF937A25754C0A9679D8B6
3. 
99. See Brownback Bill, supra note 91 (discussing the promotion of peace and security 
within the Congo and solutions to eradicate the conflict); see also McDermott Bill, supra note 
97 (discussing the promotion of peace and security within the Congo and solutions to eradicate 
the conflict). 
100. McDermott Bill, supra note 97. 
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difference between the Brownback Bill and the McDermott Bill 
regarding assistance measures is that the McDermott Bill also 
specifically focused on child labor and alleviating its negative effects, 
while the Brownback Bill did not.101 Also, unlike the Brownback Bill, 
there were no SEC disclosure requirements in McDermott’s Conflict 
Minerals legislation.102 Rather than amending the Exchange Act, the 
McDermott Bill sought to prohibit the import of certain products 
containing Conflict Minerals, and imposed penalties under Section 
592 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (“Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act”).103 
Various NGOs supported the McDermott Bill, but ultimately it did 
not pass.104 
2. SEC: US Congress’ Agency of Choice for Disclosure 
Ultimately, the SEC was tasked with enforcing the United 
States’ Conflict Minerals regulation.105 The SEC maintains that its 
mandate or mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”106 The US 
Supreme Court noted it has repeatedly declared that the fundamental 
purpose of the Exchange Act is to implement a philosophy of full 
disclosure.107 Moreover, Congress has also stated that honest markets 
cannot exist without honest publicity, and that manipulation and 
dishonest practices in the market flourish on mystery and secrecy.108 
Disclosure of material company information is considered important 
from the reasonable investor’s perspective.109 What is material to a 
reasonable investor depends upon the significance that the reasonable 
                                                                                                             
101. Id. 
102. McDermott Bill, supra note 97; Brownback Bill, supra note 91. 
103. H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009). 
104. Narine, supra note 3, at 387 (discussing the advocacy of NGOs regarding conflict 
mineral legislation). 
105. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at §VI(I)(A). 
106. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016) [hereinafter SEC, What We Do] (describing the 
Agency’s objectives and what the Agency does to achieve these objectives). 
107. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (“Underlying the adoption of 
extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy: ‘There cannot be honest 
markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place 
thrive upon mystery and secrecy.’”) 
108. Id. 
109. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
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investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented 
information.110 
In the Final Rule promulgated pursuant to Section 1502 and 
Section 13(p) of the Exchange Act, the SEC briefly explains why 
Congress chose its office as the ultimate enforcer for Conflict Mineral 
regulation to curb the Congo mineral trade.111 Congress aimed to 
mitigate the armed conflict associated with the mineral trade and 
believed Conflict Minerals disclosure use may reduce funding for 
armed groups fighting over mineral mines.112 Congress had hoped, 
ultimately, that this type of disclosure would diminish and eventually 
eradicate the conflict in the Congo.113 One of the co-sponsors for 
Section 1502 noted that such a provision would enhance transparency 
and help American consumers and investors inform their decisions 
when doing business with companies that may use Conflict 
Minerals.114 
3. Possible Alternatives to the SEC 
Some parties have argued that expanding the SEC’s duties 
beyond its congressional mandate may cause more harm than good, 
especially in the arena of foreign policy.115 As mentioned, the SEC is 
largely tasked with work involving disclosure within the financial 
sector and enforcement of laws preventing financial abuse.116 Those 
who are against tasking the SEC with enforcement duties outside of 
                                                                                                             
110. Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 (stating “[a]s we clarify today materiality depends on the 
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented 
information”) It has also been noted that the SEC’s “spin” on this materiality standard focuses 
on matters that “have affected, or will affect, a company’s profitability and financial outlook.” 
Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1433, 1434 (2002). 
111. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. See Karen E. Woody, Securities Laws as Foreign Policy, 15 NEV. L.J.  297, 301-02 
(2014) (discussing the disadvantages of tasking the SEC with work outside of its expertise); 
Veale, supra note 14, at 527 (discussing why the SEC should not be a vehicle for promoting of 
social and foreign policy goals). See also Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure 
Requirements?, supra note 110 (“As such, some have criticized the SEC for making an 
“awkward lurch into foreign policy” and forgetting that “[its] role is not to advise investors 
about what would be good for them - let alone the United States - but simply to insist that 
companies disclose all material facts about their activities.”) 
116. See SEC, What We Do, supra note 106; Woody, supra note 115.  
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the financial industry believe that both the SEC and financial 
investors are at risk for harm, and that it is likely the SEC will not 
have sufficient resources or time to work towards the goals for which 
it was actually created.117 For these reasons, the following discussion 
focuses on several suggested alternatives to combating the conflict 
associated with the mineral trade in the Congo.118 Moreover, agencies 
mentioned in both the Brownback Bill and the McDermott Bill are 
examined as possible alternatives to the SEC. 
Because of the existing procedures of using the US Customs and 
Border Protection (“Customs”) to inspect conflicted resources like 
blood diamonds, it has been argued that Customs should be tasked 
with the inspection of other conflict resources, like minerals.119 
Customs reviews all diamond import documentation, flags rough 
diamonds for review, and enters shipment information into a 
database.120 One of the primary missions of Customs is to “enhanc[e] 
the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate 
trade.”121 Through Customs, Congress may have an opportunity to 
address the Conflict Minerals problem instead of expanding the 
SEC’s mandate to address an issue the SEC “lacks precedence in 
confronting or capacity to handle effectively.”122 
It has also been suggested that using Tax Codes to address the 
Conflict Minerals problem may be a better fit than tasking the SEC 
with solving this issue.123 First, this proposal suggests to fully ban 
sourcing Conflict Minerals, and calls for a universally accepted 
                                                                                                             
117. See Woody, supra note 115, at 301 (stating that the SEC and financial investors are 
losing out in two ways: “(1) by losing the opportunity that the proper agency (i.e., one with the 
particular expertise and resources) and its experts would achieve the goal in a more efficient 
and more successful way; and (2) by reducing the ability of the mis-tasked agency to do its 
best with the proper tasks it should be accomplishing”). 
118. See Feinzeig, supra note 8 (discussing Tax Codes as an alternative); see also Veale, 
supra note 14, at 520 (discussing Customs as an alternative to detecting Conflict Minerals in 
products). 
119. See Raj, supra note 2. Blood diamonds are rough, uncut diamonds sold to fund the 
brutal civil wars of Angola and Sierra Leone. See Aryn Barker, Blood Diamonds, TIME (Aug. 
2015), http://time.com/blood-diamonds/. 
120. See US Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-978, Conflict Diamonds: 
Agency Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade Act 2 (2006), 
at 18, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06978.pdf; see also Raj, supra note 2, at 1000. 
121. About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, www.cbp.gov/about (last 
accessed Oct. 18, 2016). 
122. Raj, supra note 2, at 1021. 
123. See Feinzeig, supra note 8 (discussing Tax Codes as an alternative). 
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certification system, similar to the type that Customs uses to root out 
blood diamonds coming into the United States.124 Next, this proposal 
suggests providing tax benefits to companies that purchase conflict-
free minerals.125 These tax benefits would be similar to those given to 
taxpayers who buy a home for a first time, or rely on person and 
dependency exemptions.126 The proposal recognizes such 
incentivizing methods may not have been appropriate in prior 
years.127 However, it has been noted that the US Congress has 
transformed the Tax Code as a means to implement government 
policy and social reform.128 Other examples include the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, empowerment-zone credit, and child-care 
credit.129 
One US agency that has been seemingly overlooked to resolve 
the Conflict Minerals problem is USAID, as both the Brownback Bill 
and the McDermott Bill had suggested.130 USAID works to end 
extreme global poverty and empower various nations and 
communities in need to realize their potential.131 The core of 
USAID’s mission is its commitment to work as partners with these 
nations and communities to promote sustainable development.132 
USAID strives for empowerment and support through collaboration, 
rather than strong imposition.133 Before providing assistance to a 
certain country, USAID employs a Conflict Assessment Framework, 
which is a systematic process that analyzes and prioritizes the 
                                                                                                             
124. Id. at 983.  
125. Id. at 986. 
126. Id. at 986. 
127. Id. 
128. See Feinzeig, supra note 8 (discussing Tax Codes as an alternative); Susannah 
Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S. 
Policymaking, 50 HARV. J. LEGIS. 67, 68 (2013) (discussing the social policy benefits of using 
Tax Codes through the Internal Revenue Service “IRS” to benefit potentially marginalized 
groups). 
129. See Feinzeig, supra note 8, at 986. 
130. See Brownback Bill, supra note 91, at §6(a) (discussing Sense of Congress on 
Assistance for the Congo through USAID); see also McDermott Bill, supra note 97, at §5(a), 
(discussing Sense of Congress on Assistance for the Congo through USAID). 
131.  Who We Are, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are (last accessed Oct. 18, 
2016). 
132. Mission, Vision, Values, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-
vision-values (last accessed Oct. 18, 2016). 
133. See id. 
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dynamics of peace, conflict, stability, and instability.134 This 
assessment helps USAID with strategies, developing policies, and 
programs to effectively prevent, mitigate, and manage conflict 
dynamics in a given country.135 
Most notably, USAID has provided the Congo with assistance 
since the country’s independence.136 To date, USAID and the Office 
of US Foreign Disaster Assistance provided US$38 million in 
humanitarian assistance for the Congo.137 This assistance was in 
response to the Congo’s population displacement, yellow fever 
outbreak, deteriorating road conditions, and other complex 
emergencies.138 
4. Current US Conflict Minerals Legislation and Regulation 
The Dodd-Frank Act was passed with a number of “sleeper 
provisions” that went undetected by most investors, one of them 
being Section 1502.139 Just as the Brownback Bill had suggested in 
2009, Section 1502 amended Section 13 of the Exchange Act.140 
Labeled as the “name-and-shame” law, Section 1502 does not outlaw 
the sourcing of minerals from the Congo, but rather “aims to provide 
transparency to consumers and investors so that they can make 
informed choices about the companies with which they choose to do 
business.”141 Section 1502 tasked the SEC with promulgating rules 
requiring issuing companies to disclose whether their product 
contains or may contain Conflict Minerals originally from the 
                                                                                                             
134.  Conflict Assessment Framework: Assessment Grade, USAID (2002), 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf. 
135. Id. 
136.  DRC History, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/history 
(last accessed Oct. 18, 2016). 
137.  DRC – Complex Emergency, USAID (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/1866/drc_ce_fs03_08-02-2016.pdf. 
138. Id. 
139. Narine, supra note 3, at 388. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act to address 
financial regulatory reform in 2010 in response to the financial crisis beginning in 2008. 
Narine, supra note 3, at 387. “Sleeper provisions” are defined as provisions which garner little 
congressional or public attention at the time of enactment, but have a significant impact after 
enactment. Madeline June Kass, A Least Bad Approach For Interpreting ESA Stealth 
Provision, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 427 (2008). 
140. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13. 
141. Narine, supra note 3, at 351. 
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Congo.142 Section 1502 amended the Exchange Act by including a 
new section, Section 13(p).143 
According to the SEC, in enacting the Conflict Minerals 
Statutory Provision, Congress intended to support the humanitarian 
goal of combating the violent conflict in the Congo, which is funded 
in part by the exploitation of the mineral trade by armed groups in the 
region.144 When detailing Rule 13p-1’s background, the SEC places 
emphasis on ending the emergency humanitarian crisis, stating that 
the legislative history surrounding Section 1502 and earlier legislation 
reflects Congress’ motivation to further support the end of human 
rights abuses linked to the Conflict Minerals trade in the Covered 
Countries.145 The SEC refers to the Congo and its adjoining countries 
as “Covered Countries.”146 Adjoining countries may refer to Angola, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, 
Uganda, or Zambia.147 
The SEC also notes that parts of Section 1502 convey that 
Congress’ intention behind passing this provision was to promote 
peace and security.148 Specifically, Section 1502(d)(2)(A) states that 
two years after the 2010 enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
annually after that, the Comptroller General of the United States shall 
submit to the relevant congressional committee a report including an 
“assessment of the effectiveness” of Section 1502 in promoting peace 
and security.149 By enacting Section 1502, the SEC also noted that 
Congress intended to reduce funding for the armed groups 
                                                                                                             
142. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 2213-2218 (2010). 
143. See SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13. 
144. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § I(A). 
145. Id. According to the SEC, “Covered Countries” refers to both the Congo and its 
adjoining countries. Section 1502(e)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act defines “adjoining country” as 
a country sharing an internationally recognized border with the Congo.  
146. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at n.8. 
147. Nanda, supra note 23, at 288. 
148. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13; Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 
1502(d)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 2213-2218 (2010) (stating that two years after enactment of the Act 
and annually thereafter, “the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report that includes” an “assessment of the 
effectiveness” of the Conflict Minerals Statutory Provision “in promoting peace and security” 
in the Covered Countries). 
149. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at n.13.  
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contributing to the strife in the Congo, thus “put[ting] pressure on 
such groups to end the conflict.”150 
The SEC announced the release of Rule 13p-1 and Form SD to 
implement Section 13(p), effective November 13, 2012.151 To 
streamline the disclosure process, the SEC provided a three-step plan 
to ensure proper compliance with due diligence and disclosure 
requirements for Rule 13p-1 and Form SD.152 The first step involves 
determining who must comply with Section 1502.153 This step is 
satisfied if a company (1) is an issuer that files reports with the 
Commission under Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange 
Act and (2) manufactures products containing Conflict Minerals 
necessary for the product’s main functions or necessary for the 
production of this product, or alternatively, contracts to manufacture 
such products.154 If both conditions are met, a company should move 
on to the next step.155 
The second step of proper compliance requires completing a 
reasonable country of origin inquiry.156 The SEC does not provide 
detailed guidance regarding the completion of this inquiry.157 As long 
as the inquiry is made in good faith and reasonably designed to 
determine whether any of the Conflict Minerals originated in the 
Covered Countries or are from recycled or scrap sources, the 
reasonable country of origin inquiry requirement is satisfied.158 After 
making a reasonable country of origin inquiry, issuers may not need 
to proceed with the final step of this plan.159 Rather, their disclosure 
obligations may be limited to specific items on the SEC’s new Form 
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152, at 444 (discussing the SEC’s Conflict Mineral regulation requirements). 
157. Harline, supra note 152, at 445.  
158. SEC Final Rule Release, supra note 13, at § II(D).  
159. Id; see also Harline, supra note 152, at 446 (discussing the SEC’s Conflict Mineral 
regulation requirements).  
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SD.160 If, however, a company determines that the Conflict Minerals 
may have originated from one of the Covered Countries, then the 
issuer must move to the third and final step.161 
During this final step, an issuer must submit a report describing 
what measures the issuer has taken to exercise due diligence on the 
minerals’ source chain of custody if an issuer’s products contained 
Conflict Minerals originating from the Covered Countries.162 Instead 
of simply filing a Form SD, companies whose products may contain 
Conflict Minerals from the Covered Countries would also need to file 
a much more detailed report, known as the “Conflict Minerals 
Report.”163 Issuers are required to exercise due diligence regarding 
the source and chain of custody of the Conflict Minerals in their 
products.164 The SEC recommends that issuers follow a nationally or 
internationally recognized due diligence framework.165 The SEC 
recognizes the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas (“OECD Due Diligence Guidelines”) as an international 
framework for mineral supply chain disclosure and bases much of 
their Rule on these guidelines.166 The Conflict Minerals Report must 
also include an independent private sector auditor report as well as a 
description of products that have not found to be “DRC Conflict 
Free” or “DRC Conflict Undeterminable.”167 
Following the decision in National Association of 
Manufacturers, et al. v. SEC, the SEC provided further guidance 
regarding compliance with Rule 13p-1 and Form SD.168 The SEC no 
longer requires companies to describe its products as “DRC conflict 
free,” “having not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’” or “DRC 
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conflict undeterminable” in its Conflict Minerals Report on their 
website.169 For products that are not described as conflict free, 
companies must disclose smelter and/or refiners that processed the 
minerals, the country or origin (if known), and their efforts to 
determine the mine or location of origin of these minerals.170 
5. Section 1502’s Effects on the Congo 
In 2009, the Congo’s mineral wealth was estimated to total 
US$24 trillion.171 Today, the estimated value of the Congo’s mineral 
wealth remains the same, with the conflict in the Congo continuing.172 
Mining and extraction make up about twenty-two percent of the 
Congo’s GDP.173 Since Section 1502 has been implemented, there is 
an ongoing debate whether the Rule has served its purpose in 
combating the conflict associated with mineral mining in the 
Congo.174 Those who consider Conflict Mineral regulation to be 
effective in following its objectives note that prior to Section 1502’s 
passage, few companies made the extra effort to audit the source of 
the minerals in their products.175 Supporters of Conflict Minerals 
regulation also note the significant improvements in the transparency 
of corporate supply chains, and though there are still active Conflict 
Mineral mines present in the Congo, supporters noted a decrease in 
the number of these mines in the Congo.176 They also believe that 
Conflict Minerals provision has created a “strong market incentive” 
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by reducing the market for non-traceable minerals.177 The shrinking 
of this market occurred as a consequence of the decrease in pricing 
for minerals not certified as “conflict-free.”178 The pricing for 
minerals not certified as “conflict-free” ranges between thirty and 
sixty percent less than minerals that are certified through sourcing 
programs.179 The differential in pricing has made the trade in 3T+G 
minerals less attractive for some armed groups fueling the conflict in 
the Congo.180 
Additionally, Bisie, one of the world’s largest and most 
profitable tin mines is now largely demilitarized.181 Bisie generated 
hundreds of millions of dollars for armed groups responsible for the 
conflict in the Congo.182 It has also been reported that over sixty 
percent of the tantalum mines in Rubaya, Rwanda (one of the 
Covered Countries) are conflict-free. Bosco “Terminator” Ntaganda, 
a prominent warlord who previously derived major revenue from 
these tantalum mines has surrendered to the International Criminal 
Court.183 
In 2014, the International Peace Information Service found that 
seventy percent of Conflict Mineral mines surveyed across the 
Eastern Congo were no longer controlled by armed forces.184 The 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region now runs an 
emerging certification mechanism, validating numerous mines in the 
Congo as conflict-free.185 As of June 21, 2015, 141 mines in the 
Congo were validated as conflict-free by teams comprised of UN 
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officials and Congolese civil society, business, and government 
representatives.186 
While many support Conflict Minerals regulation and its 
objectives for the Congo, its adjoining countries, and Conflict Mineral 
mining, there have also been many critics who argue that the Conflict 
Minerals provision causes more harm than good.187 In September 
2014, seventy academics, researchers, journalists, and advocates 
published an open letter criticizing Section 1502, arguing that the 
provision “fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between 
minerals and conflict,” that internal UN assessments show that eight 
percent of the Congo’s conflicts are linked to mineral mining, and that 
specific motivations for the conflict differ across the various armed 
groups within the region.188 
Critics also note the adverse effects of the law on the Congolese 
miners themselves.189 Malaysia Smelting, a company known as one of 
the world’s largest producers of tin, stopped purchasing minerals from 
the Congo entirely.190 Similar to other companies in Malaysia 
Smelting’s position, Malaysia Smelting feared being seen as a 
Conflict Minerals user, and did not believe it could determine which 
minerals were conflict-free, leading to their halt in mineral purchases 
from the Congo.191 In 2012, it had been estimated that between five 
and twelve million Congolese civilians were inadvertently and 
directly negatively affected by Section 1502.192 Before Dodd-Frank 
passed, miners sold a kilogram of tin for about US$7, but now miners 
only get about US$4 for a kilogram of tin despite the global market 
price averaging at about US$22 per kilogram in 2015.193 Because 
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many Congolese depend on the money they receive as miners to 
support their livelihoods, the miners who are out of work often cannot 
feed their families or afford medical treatment.194 Moreover, the lack 
of earnings for these miners seemingly produces a domino effect on 
their village’s economy.195 Without earning a living, many local 
markets, shopkeepers, and seamstresses are also earning significantly 
less.196 
Lack of transparency is also a significant issue in the due 
diligence efforts required by Section 1502.197 There have been cases 
of mining officials selling certification tags at US$20, which are then 
used to label “dirty” tin as “conflict-free.”198 Mine officials only earn 
about US$60 a month, so they are considered “easy to bribe.”199 
Emmanuel Ndimubanzi, the head of North Kivu’s mining division 
recently stated that there were no mines tagging the output of their 
minerals, so buyers had no way of identifying the minerals’ origins.200 
The lack of tagging runs counter to Section 1502’s objective of 
certification of the minerals’ origins.201 
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S APPROACH: IN-PROGRESS 
Reacting to the steps the United States took in combating the 
conflict associated with the mineral trade, the European Union 
decided to embark on similar regulation of its own. First, this Part 
reviews how the European Union planned to address the Conflict 
Minerals issue from their end. Next, this Part reviews the European 
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Union’s proposed Conflict Minerals regulation, and briefly describes 
the European Commission’s efforts in aiding the Congo. 
A. The European Union’s Response to the United States’ Conflict 
Minerals Legislation 
In October 2010, soon after Dodd-Frank’s passage, the European 
Parliament (“Parliament”) passed a resolution calling upon the 
European Union to draft similar legislation to Section 1502.202 The 
following year, the European Commission (“Commission”) then 
announced its intention to improve transparency in the minerals 
supply chain and aspects of due diligence.203 The European Union had 
been actively involved in an OECD initiative to address the Conflict 
Minerals problem.204 This initiative resulted in the OECD Due 
Diligence Guidelines, which provided a due diligence measures 
framework for companies whose products may contain Conflict 
Minerals.205 Like the United States, the European Union recognizes 
the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines as an international framework 
for disclosure of the use of Conflict Minerals.206 
Between March and June 2013, the European Union embarked 
on a public consultation to obtain interested parties’ views on a 
potential EU initiative for responsible sourcing of minerals coming 
from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.”207 The European Union 
then undertook further in-depth consultations and an impact 
assessment of the possible enactment of Conflict Minerals 
regulation.208 The following year, the Parliament’s development 
committee produced a report on promoting development through 
responsible business practices, specifically examining the role of 
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extractive industries in developing countries.209 The report stressed 
the need for an European Union regulation that required companies 
using minerals and other resources originating from conflict-affected 
areas to perform due diligence in accordance with the OECD Due 
Diligence Guidelines.210 The Parliament also suggested in its report 
that draft Conflict Minerals regulation “be comparable with the 
obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act, so that when fulfilling 
European Union obligations on responsible sourcing companies 
automatically fulfill the obligations under United States 
legislation.”211 
B. The European Commission’s Proposed Conflict Minerals 
Legislation 
The Commission is the European Union’s politically 
independent executive arm, solely responsible for drafting European 
legislation proposals and implementing the decisions of Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union.212 In March 2014, the 
Commission released a draft regulation establishing a self-
certification system for importers of Conflict Minerals and other 
metals.213 The proposed regulation establishes a system for supply 
chain due diligence self-certification intended to fight the conflict 
associated with the mineral trade in affected countries.214 
According to the Commission, the regulation is designed to 
“curtail opportunities for armed groups and security forces to trade in 
tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold” and provide 
“transparency and certainty as regards [to] the supply practices of 
importers, smelters and refiners sourcing from conflict-affected and 
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high-risk areas.”215 Unlike Section 1502, this proposed regulation is a 
voluntary framework for companies in the European Union who 
choose to be self-certified as “responsible importers.”216 
The proposed regulation mandates that the responsible importer 
of minerals or metals must clearly communicate to suppliers and the 
public its supply chain policy for the minerals and metals potentially 
sourced from conflict-affected and high-risk areas.217 Responsible 
importers are also expected to model its supply chain policy standards 
against the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines.218 The proposed 
regulation requires the responsible importer to structure its internal 
management system to maintain supply chain due diligence by 
assigning responsibility to senior staff to supervise this process, and 
maintain records for at least five years.219 Moreover, the responsible 
importer is also expected to operate a “chain of custody” system to 
trace the origins of the minerals through the supply chain.220 This 
chain of custody system must be supported by documentation 
describing the mineral, name and address of its supplier, country of 
origin, quantities, and if it is determined that the minerals did come 
from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, the mine of mineral origin, 
locations where the mineral was traded, and processed and taxes and 
fees paid.221 
The responsible importer is also required to identify and assess 
the risks in its mineral supply chain and take the necessary steps to 
prevent and/or mitigate these risks.222 The proposed regulation 
imposes third-party obligations on the responsible importer, requiring 
the responsible importer to perform audits through independent third-
party audits similar to requirements under Section 1502.223 The 
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independent third-party audits must include an audit of the importer’s 
activities, processes, and systems used to implement the mineral 
supply chain due diligence policies.224 
By March 31st of each year, responsible importers are expected 
to submit to the relevant Member State documentation certifying 
conformity with the obligations provided by the proposed regulation, 
independent-third party audit reports, and disclosure of information 
learned about the origin of minerals used during the previous year, 
“publicly report[ing] as widely as possible, including on the internet 
and on an annual basis on its supply chain due diligence policies and 
practices for responsible sourcing.”225 
C. The European Union’s Path to Implementing Conflict Minerals 
Legislation 
Soon after the Commission released its proposed Conflict 
Minerals regulation, critics were quick to note its weaknesses and 
inevitable ineffectiveness to prevent financing of conflict in the 
Congo and other affected countries.226 Sophia Pickles, a 
spokeswoman for the campaigning group Global Witness stated that 
because of the proposed regulation’s voluntary nature, the proposal is 
“tantamount to the EU saying that it’s ok for companies to choose not 
to behave responsibly,” undermining the duty to “protect human 
rights, which is well-established under international law.”227 
Moreover, Pickles noted that there is already a voluntary due 
diligence framework in place–the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidelines.228 
Many critics believed that the Commission’s proposed 
regulation would fail to put the European Union at the same level of 
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responsible sourcing standards as their US competitors.229 Instead of 
raising the bar on responsible sourcing standards, critics argue that a 
voluntary due diligence scheme to track the origin of minerals may 
threaten international standards and weaken the objectives for 
responsible mineral sourcing.230 Many also contend that by limiting 
the proposed regulation to importers of these minerals, the 
Commission has failed to influence the behavior of companies that 
market and import finished products possibly containing Conflict 
Minerals.231 Companies that would be affected by the Commission’s 
proposed regulation would be those placing raw minerals on the 
market (i.e., smelters), and not include companies who import 
assembled products like cellular phones, which may already contain 
Conflict Minerals.232 
In 2015, a year after the Commission’s release of its proposed 
Conflict Minerals regulation, Parliament voted in favor of a 
mandatory certification system for importers of Conflict Minerals and 
manufacturers of products that may contain Conflict Minerals.233 
Lawmakers in the Parliament proposed last minute amendments 
calling for a mandatory monitoring system from conflict-affected 
areas like the Congo, Colombia and Afghanistan.234 The amendments 
passed by a vote of 378 to 300, with eleven abstentions.235 
In June 2016, EU lawmakers, Member States and the 
Commission provisionally agreed upon a proposed Conflict Minerals 
regulation and planned to formally adopt these regulations within the 
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coming months.236 Currently, there are no new drafts available, 
however it has been reported that the European Union plans to 
implement mandatory due diligence procedures, requiring disclosure 
for direct importers of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk 
areas.237 A distinction between this provisionally agreed-upon 
regulation and the United States’ is that the European Union’s 
regulation would cover all conflict regions worldwide, and is not 
limited to the Congo and its adjacent countries.238 Smaller businesses, 
such as dentistry practices, that trade in minerals would be exempt 
from this due diligence and disclosure requirement.239 Electronics 
manufacturers would not have a due diligence obligation, but would 
be asked to voluntarily disclose the details of their mineral 
sourcing.240 
D. The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection 
Unlike the United States, it is not entirely clear which EU 
agency would enforce their regulation, and thus there have not been 
many suggested agency alternatives.241 There is, however, an agency 
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in the European Union with similar duties to USAID.242 The 
European Commission has an office dedicated to providing countries 
in need with humanitarian aid and relief, though the office does not 
directly address how Conflict Minerals play a role in the Congolese 
humanitarian crisis.243 The Directorate-General for European Civil 
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (“ECHO”) is 
responsible for ensuring rapid and effective delivery of EU relief 
assistance through humanitarian aid and civil protection.244 ECHO 
recognizes that the Congolese humanitarian crisis is both complex 
and long-standing.245 ECHO acknowledges that the crisis stems from 
constant fighting in the Congo, leading to the displacement of 
Congolese individuals, looting and violent acts like rape, kidnapping, 
and forced child labor.246 ECHO provides the Congo with shelter, 
water, food, sanitation facilities, and medical services to the displaced 
Congolese and responding to the needs of returning refugees.247 
ECHO faces problems with accessing remote parts of the Congo to 
provide help because of poor infrastructure and lack of security.248 
The Commission operates a dedicated humanitarian air service called 
“ECHO Flight” and helicopters, which transport humanitarian 
personnel and supplies to remote areas in the Congo where access by 
road is impossible or unsafe.249 
IV. IMPROVING UPON SECTION 1502’S SHORTCOMINGS 
This Part argues that US Conflict Mineral legislation is not 
enough to combat the human rights abuses in the Congo. Here, the 
shortcomings of the US Conflict Mineral legislation are discussed. 
Additionally, this Part details what the European Union should ideally 
improve upon when finalizing their own Conflict Minerals regulation. 
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A. Do Not Task a Securities Commission with Combating Human 
Rights Violations 
First, the European Union should focus on which office in its 
government is best suited to enforce Conflict Minerals regulation.250 
As well-intentioned as the drafters of Section 1502 may have been, 
the end result of the provision and the rules that followed may not 
have actually helped the Congo and its victims as seamlessly as 
advocates convey.251 Although there has been a reduction in active 
Conflict Mineral mines in the Congo, the effects of these armed 
forces and Section 1502 on the Congolese people themselves require 
more attention.252 As a reminder, the SEC’s mission is to “protect 
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate 
capital formation.”253 When thinking about the SEC, the fight against 
human rights abuses is presumably not the first topic that surfaces in 
one’s mind.254 Rather, the SEC is best known for its work with the 
financial sector and enforcement of laws preventing financial 
abuse.255 
Investors may consider the use of Conflict Minerals as material 
information in making investment decisions, since public perception 
of the armed conflict could negatively affect a company’s profits.256 
Therefore, at the most basic level, it is easy to see why the SEC could 
be an appropriate agency for the job.257 It requires the disclosure of 
the use of Conflict Minerals in a company’s manufactured products, 
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which is conceivably material information that could adversely affect 
an investor’s stake in a company.258 
However, the SEC explicitly pointed out that Congress’ 
intention in passing Section 1502 was to support the “humanitarian 
goal” of combating the violent conflict in the Congo, partially 
financed by the exploitation of trade minerals by armed groups, and to 
“promote peace and security.”259 As an agency whose mission is to 
protect investors and facilitate capital formation, the SEC is not as 
well-versed in the mineral trade and fighting human rights as other 
offices and agencies may be.260 Moreover, it is also interesting to note 
that Section 1502 was considered a Dodd-Frank sleeper provision.261 
Perhaps its drafters intended for this to be so as congressional or 
public attention before enactment might have gutted the provision 
altogether.262 
Customs may be one agency that could be better equipped to 
deal with the Conflict Minerals trade issue.263 As an agency tasked to 
root out blood diamonds, it is possible that their blood diamond 
inspection procedures could serve as a model when inspecting 
products for Conflict Minerals.264 Alternatively, the IRS may also be 
the better choice as a deterrent for the use of Conflict Minerals by 
various corporations.265 By providing corporations with a tax benefit 
for avoiding Conflict Minerals altogether, this benefit could quite 
possibly condition many companies to conduct thorough due 
diligence before using certain minerals in their products.266 
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Although both Customs and the IRS may be much better choices 
for enforcing Section 1502, both agencies, much like the SEC, are not 
traditionally known to deal directly with human rights issues.267 In 
conjunction with either Customs or the IRS, USAID may finally 
address Congress’ concerns with promoting peace and prosperity in 
the Congo.268 Since USAID has already worked closely with the 
Congo by providing millions of dollars of humanitarian relief, tasking 
USAID to also focus on victims of the Conflict Mineral trade may 
better alleviate the adverse effects of the armed conflict and 
corporations moving their mineral business elsewhere.269 One 
suggestion might be for the USAID to collaborate with the Congolese 
to implement a more transparent supply chain.270 Because the USAID 
strives for empowerment without imposition, the USAID could help 
diminish the conflict in the mineral trade by sending investigators to 
examine the tiers of extraction, transport, handling, trading, 
processing, smelting, refining, and alloying in the supply chain.271 
Once glaring issues such as abusive labor conditions are identified in 
the different tiers of the supply chain, USAID investigators can advise 
the appropriate government agencies and recommend more funding to 
implement a system to eradicate these conditions.272  
The SEC’s purpose is to protect investors and facilitate capital 
formation.273 Adding the responsibility of overseeing Conflict 
Mineral supply chain due diligence may overwhelm an agency that is 
likely not experienced enough to meet Congress’ objectives in the 
first place.274 Congress has seemingly broadened the SEC’s mission 
beyond investor protection and capital formation.275 If Congress will 
go so far as to broaden or alter the SEC’s mission, perhaps it should 
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directly address the Conflict Minerals issue rather than burden the 
SEC.276 
The European Union should avoid tasking a securities 
commission with the implementation of Conflict Minerals regulation 
as well.277 The European Union may look into creating a special 
commission in addressing the Conflict Minerals problem, which 
could be a combination of two different agencies working in 
tandem.278 The European Union could task their customs agency with 
monitoring the source of incoming minerals, which may have similar 
procedures in rooting out blood diamonds.279 Another alternative 
would be placing more monetary penalties through their tax 
agency.280 If the European Union decides to take either route, it 
should bear in mind that these offices should work in conjunction 
with ECHO.281 
B. Human Rights: There is More the European Union Can and 
Should Do 
Currently, the European Union is still in the process of finalizing 
their version of a Conflict Minerals regulation.282 The European 
Union can learn a great deal from the United States’ missteps of 
tasking a securities commission with a critical human rights issue.283 
In light of the European Union’s pending regulation, the Parliament 
and the Commission must focus on what should be the real objective 
behind Conflict Minerals regulation in any nation: protecting human 
rights in conflict-affected countries.284 
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Even if the European Union’s forthcoming Conflict Minerals 
regulation is passed in the near future, reports have indicated it still 
does not adequately address the humanitarian aspect of this Note’s 
argument.285 In fact, if recent reports hold true, the current version of 
their Conflict Minerals regulation is problematic since it seems to 
only require direct importers of minerals to disclose sources, while 
electronics companies are left off the hook and may disclose at their 
discretion.286 Therefore, the European Union should focus on better 
tackling disclosure issues and human rights if they decide to rework 
their Conflict Minerals regulation after its passage.287 
One suggestion may be to follow the steps of the Brownback 
Bill and McDermott Bill, both of which called for increased 
assistance to the Congolese by facilitating medical treatment, 
humanitarian relief, rehabilitation services, and psychological 
assistance, among others.288 Drafting a provision providing this type 
of assistance and funding for individuals in affected countries 
addresses the humanitarian goal that the US Congress had in mind 
when passing Section 1502.289 
Both USAID and ECHO are already deeply involved with 
providing humanitarian assistance and relief to the Congo.290 The 
European Union should try to expand ECHO’s responsibilities and 
provide more focus on the victims of the Conflict Mineral trade.291 
Admittedly, such a measure would increase costs to the government. 
However, if the overarching goal is to help victims of violence and 
armed conflict, this goal is seemingly within the reach of what ECHO 
strives for: the provision of humanitarian aid and civil protection to 
countries in need.292 Since ECHO is familiar with the Congo and its 
conflict, the office should try to broaden its reach over countries 
affected by conflict associated with mineral trade.293 Like the 
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Brownback Bill suggested, ECHO should increase protection and 
services for communities adversely affected by the mineral trade, 
strengthen the actual management and trade of natural resources, and 
improve conditions and livelihood prospects of mineral miners.294 
Additionally, ECHO should resemble the McDermott Bill by also 
focusing on alleviating child labor abuse and providing protections 
for these children.295 Perhaps, ECHO can try to help the Congo and 
other affected countries develop a procedure where only individuals 
of a certain age are allowed to work as miners.296 Although the Congo 
does have laws in place limiting labor to children over the age of 
sixteen, and dangerous labor to children over the age of eighteen, the 
penalties in place for violating these provisions are inadequate.297 
ECHO should focus on advising government offices tasked with 
enforcing Conflict Mineral regulation.298 Perhaps ECHO can suggest 
that EU government officials meet with Congolese government 
officials to discuss strengthening the punishment for those who 
violate child labor laws.299 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s world, where churning out profit for shareholders 
often takes priority, the adverse effects of these moneymaking 
business practices are often overlooked.300 As evidenced by failed 
Conflict Minerals bills, the eventual passage of Section 1502 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and the current EU regulation process, many 
individuals are no longer able to turn a blind eye to financing 
practices that fuel violence and lead to death.301 Legislation focusing 
on the situations that enable this conflict has had some beneficial 
effects such as an increase in corporate transparency, the decrease in 
sales of minerals not certified to be conflict free, and the 
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demilitarization of armed forces said to contribute to the conflict in 
the Congo.302 
Because electronic devices, especially smartphones, are as 
pervasive today as pay phones were decades ago, it is of great 
importance to be a responsible consumer.303 Otherwise, there may be 
a chance your smartphone is comprised of minerals mined under 
devastating conditions, whether it be in the Congo or other countries 
affected by similar conflict.304 It is difficult to be responsible without 
transparency from the companies that sell these products.305 Without 
proper disclosure, the cycle of unknowingly funding armed forces 
facilitating violence within conflict-affected countries will only 
continue.306 Fortunately, there has been a movement towards more 
disclosure to avoid fueling conflict in other countries, as seen with 
United States’ Section 1502 provision and the European Union’s 
efforts towards creating a similar provision in their arena.307 
However, our society is still far from meeting the humanitarian 
goal of dispelling the conflict in conflict-affected countries.308 It sends 
a powerful message that the United States and the European Union 
are taking steps to combat human rights violations, but there is still 
more that needs to be done.309 US Conflict Minerals regulation 
seemingly neglects the individuals it was meant to protect.310 The 
European Union can remedy this misstep by drafting its own version 
of Conflict Minerals regulation with affected individuals in mind, and 
perhaps the United States will follow suit to improve its own current 
regulation. 
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